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Statutory Interpretation in
America: Dipping into
Legislative History ll*
By Reed Dickerson
Recent Developments
Since 1975 (when The Interpretation and Application oJ Statutes was
published), there have been a number of attempts to clarify the use of
legislative history in the judicial handling of statutes. Some have been
frontal attacks, but most have been incidental to efforts directed toward
broader legislative problems such as the interpretation of statutes
generally.
In his second Carpentier lecture at Columbia University, 3 Professor
James Willard Hurst recently discussed general trends in the interpreta-
tion of statutes. Although in a footnote he later impliedly acknowledged
the dichotomy between the cognitive and the creative judicial functions, 54
his delivered text dealt only with "interpretation." This limited the
chance that his audience might sense the relevance of asking whether it
should make any difference whether legislative history was being used for
purposes ofjudicial law finding or for purposes ofjudicial law making. He
hints that it does, but only in his observation that American courts
regularly require that persons offering "outside" evidence first show that
the text, taken by itself, is uncertain.5 This makes good communication
sense only if it can be assumed that the material in question is not part of
the proper context of the statute (thus excluding it from the cognitive
process) and if it can be assumed that the uncertainty is invincible and not
merely apparent. For most legal minds, such a hint is too fragile to inform
and persuade.
Although Hurst urges caution in the use of legislative history, he is
reluctant to rule it out for purposes of cognition or confine it to
confirmation. Like most modern academics, who have been heavily
exposed to the precepts of legal realism, he seems overly vulnerable to the
argument that, since most courts are doing something, that something
defines compelling legal principle.
56
One significant trend is for the courts to use legislative history mostly to
define ulterior legislative purpose rather than to define legislative
meaning. Certainly, a court should not allow its cognitive judgment to be
* This is the continuation of the article commencing at p. 76 supra-Editor.
5 SeeJ. Hurst, supra note 51, at 31.
5' See ibid. at 32 note. 3.
sg Ibid. at 53, 55-56.
5' Ibid. 54-55.
STATUTE LAW REVIEW
affected by any extrinsic statement, by whomever uttered, that purports to
give the meaning of the statute and thus to erode the documentary
exclusivity that every American constitution gives to statutes. This is not a
constitutional mandate of literalism, but a constitutional mandate that the
effectiveness of a statute be confined to its text as conditioned by its total
context. One of the most important causes of the prevailing confusion is
the failure to recognize the limits of external context.
Another trend, observed by Hurst, is that "[f]ew rules of competence
limit resort to evidence ... outside the statute books." 57 But if there are
"sound reasons for caution in looking beyond the statute book for
evidence of the legislature's intention ' '58 (including constitutional reasons
not limited to the separation of powers), it might be appropriate to suggest
stiffer rules of competence. Hurst's reasons for caution are sound, but in
the hands of the great bulk of American judges, who remain woefully
ignorant of the realities of the legislative process, such rules need much
stiffening if they are to be effective safeguards.
Professor and long-time state senator Jack Davies, in his recent
"nutshell" book on legislation, after surveying the practical aspects of
legislation and acknowledging the usefulness of background context
supplied by general knowledge (which absolves him of literalism),
concludes that courts should "discourage the use of legislative history."
59
"... Legislative history can raise more questions than it answers.
One legislator cannot speak for the full institution .... Legislative
debates, studies, committee reports, and official records are difficult
to find, lengthy, self-contradictory, and of uncertain reliability....
[Because the use of legislative history is costly, the] more expensive
technique favors wealthy interests over interests with limited
resources."
60
Having been persuaded by these considerations, Davies found no
occasion in his brief treatise to rely also on constitutional considerations or
the subtleties of communication theory.
On the other hand, Professor John M. Kernochan, in his 1976 Read
Memorial Lecture at Dalhousie University, found it hard to "understand
why the minister whose department sponsored a bill and who pilots it
through the House of Commons is not to be considered a reliable
spokesman.... The problem of isolating reliable information in Har-
sard ... is surely not insuperable if one locates the responsible
spokesman."
6 1
I assume that Kernochan, like Davies, is talking about the cognitive
function. In any event, his assertion is very "iffy" here; reliability does not
depend solely on proximity to the bill and moral integrity. Certainly,
57 Ibid. at 53.
58 Ibid. at 54.59J. Davies, Legislative Law and Process in a Nutshell 255-256 (1975).
60 Ibid. at 255. Davies' misgivings are confirmed in Mangum, "Legislative History in the
Interpretation ofLaws: An Illustrative Case Study" [19831 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 281.
61 Kernochan, "Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of Method" (1976) 3 Dalhousie L.J.
333, 351.
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competing statements as to what the bill means are almost worthless and
for a judge to rely on them is, in effect, to abdicate his own constitutional
responsibility to ascertain meaning. In a hectic context in which bills
"should be made to pass as razors are made to sell," 62 the will to succeed
too often outruns the will not to mislead.
As for the practical availability of legislative materials to the legislative
audience, Kernochan says that:
. ... The problem of availability would surely be solved by public or
private initiative if the [English] rules were changed. In the United
States, in the federal courts, there is now a long tradition of resort to
so-called internal legislative history materials .... In sum, the full
range of legislative history material is called upon for interpretative
aid at the federal level. In using such materials, the courts . . . have
demonstrated, again and again, a capacity to weigh evidence drawn
from that process ..... 63
But if public or private initiative would solve the availability problem in
England, why has the problem not yet been satisfactorily solved for
Federal legislative history, where the opportunity to solve has presumably
been as long-lived as the tradition of resort that created it? (Or is English
initiative superior to our own?) Although physical availability has
recently improved with the growth in number and holdings of depositary
libraries, and the mechanical burdens of research have been greatly
lightened, for example, by the privately published research aids of the
Congressional Information Service, practical availability to the great bulk
of the legislative audience is still effectively stifled by the burgeoning
complexities and the economics of research.6 4
But suppose that the existing kinds of legislative history could be and
were made adequately available. In view of "Murphy's law" that no
bulletin board or parking lot is ever large enough, coupled with the fact
that today's extrinsic evidences of legislative attitudes are at best sporadic
and fragmentary, would not this new availability result largely in
12 R. Dickerson. supra note 3, at 155 (footnote omitted).
, Kernochan. supra note 61, at 351 (footnotes omitted).
6 See R. Dickerson, supra note 3, at 147-154. Since 1970, Congressional Information Service,
Inc., has privately published a service that reproduces in microfiche all congressional
reports, hearings, committee prints, and other legislative documents except the
Congressional Record. It provides indexes by subject, name of author or witness, official
or popular name, bill number, and public law number. The service is available in almost
all academic law libraries, most universities, and large public libraries, and in many court
or law-firm libraries. The index is available also through computerized bibliographic
services such as DIALOG and ORBIT.
On the other hand, the service does not reach pre-1970 Federal materials or any state
materials. It is expensive to own and time-consuming to use (committee working papers
alone aggregate more than 850,000 pages a year; CIS 1981 General Abstracts xi). The
aggregate extra expense makes use economically feasible for the practitioner onl in
controversies involving large sums of money or matters of great importance. Also, what
does the conscientious legal advisor rely on between the date ofenactment and CIS's date
of publication? And should the government be able to rely on a private system that it
neither owns nor controls to disseminate assumedly binding knowledge respecting the
laws that it enacts?
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increasing the judicial appetite for legislative materials? What about
executive sessions? What about relevant corridor or backroom negotia-
tions? Given the courts' and lawyers' already staggering workloads of
litigation, could even the courts' more modest appetite ever be satisfied?
Even if Kernochan's dreams of availability were realizable, note that
both major modern institutional studies of legislative history,
California's 65 and England-Scotland's, 66 resulted in suggestions, not for
opening the floodgates, but for drafting specially prepared statements of
legislative purpose or intent. California's study group rejected using
draftsmen's statements,67 but recommended testing beefed-up committee
reports.68 Britain's commissioners recommended tentative preparation of
explanatory materials on a selective basis, to be taken into account if the
statute referred to the material in question. 69
Most surprising is Kernochan's assertion that the Supreme Court has
shown its capacity to evaluate legislative history. 71 My own reading of
Supreme Court cases tells me that beyond a gradual trend to loosen
restrictions the Supreme Court has no coherent philosophy. This should
surprise no one who is privy to the long standing deficiencies in legal
education regarding legislation and the legislative process. Most courts
simply have no realistic grasp of how legislation is put together.
Confirmation of their inadequacies appears in recent studies of the United
States Supreme Court and of California's Supreme Court.71
The clinching argument for Kernochan is that the Supreme Court
shows no discernible disposition to retreat from its current faith in
legislative history as providing "significant insights into legislative
intent," a faith "tested by experience." 72 If there is faith here, it is an
amorphous faith unsupported by a comprehensive and coherent philoso-
phy. Moreover, the Supreme Court is not likely to develop such a
philosophy so long as it remains deficient in its understanding of the
legislative process and continues to scramble general communication
theory with its almost standardless judicial law making. How Kernochan
can conclude that it has tested and vindicated what adds up to a
non-theory is hard to see. Even in "realist" jurisprudence, doctrinal
confusion is hardly vindicated simply because it is deeply entrenched.
65 Final Report of the Sub-Committee on Legislative Intent of the Assembly Committee on Rules, Vol. 28,
No. 1, Assembly Interim Committee Reports 30-33 (1961-1963) (hereinafter cited as
"Final Report").
66 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, the Interpretation of Statutes 38-43 (1972)
(hereinafter cited as "Commission").
67 Final Report, supra note 65, at 30-33.
Ibid. 26-30.
69 Commission, supra note 66, at 42, 50, 51 (app. A, cl. l(1)(e)). Incorporation by reference
makes the material functionally a part of the statute, but presumably not of compelling
force.
70 See Kernochan, supra note 61, at 351 -353 (referring to the capacity of tbe Federal courts in
general).
71 See Wald, "Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme
Court Term" (1983) 68 Iowa L. Rev. 195; Comment, infra note 94; Smith, infra note 98.
72 Kernochan, supra note 61, at 352. But see Wald, supra note 71, at 214 ("I am left with the
sense.., that consistent and uniform rules for statutory construction and use of legislative
materials are not being followed today").
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Finally, Kernochan brushes aside the practical burdens that the
pressure to consult legislative history poses for the counselor not yet
confronted with specific litigation. We should not curtail reliance, he
implies, until "a more extensive investigation of the practical experience
with the use of such material" has been made. 73 But the matter needs no
formal sociological study, because counsel for even a substantial
enterprise obviously cannot evaluate the sweep of legislative histories of
the many new and old statutes that affect that enterprise as those histories
might bear on a myriad of plausible problems yet to arise. The problem is
formidable enough even if the meaning of the statute is determined only
by the enacted text as conditioned by the shared background of general
knowledge and tacit assumptions that constitute its external context.
It is refreshing to read the Rhodes-White-Goldman investigation of
legislative history, 74 conducted from a Florida point of view, by authors
who show a surprisingly detailed understanding of the realities of state
statute making. Their general thesis is that the constitutional separation
of powers requires a conscientious search for legislative intent, which
includes investigating legislative history and other extrinsic materials in
instances where the circumstances disclose relevant uncertainty.75 Find-
ing most of Florida's kinds of legislative history of questionable value, they
urge caution in its use by the courts.7 6 To this end they offer criteria for
sifting.77 Finally, they offer elaborate suggestions for (1) requiring
beefed-up committee reports; (2) recording and retaining the records of
committee hearings and floor debates; and (3) requiring sponsors'
statements of intent.
78
Unfortunately, the authors' grasp of legislative procedure outruns their
grasp of constitutional limitations and the basic principles of communica-
tion. The result is a loosely argued legal rationale yielding unconvincing
conclusions. Their most serious deficiency is their failure to appreciate the
importance of knowing whether legislative history is being used to find
legislative meaning or to supplement it. Second, they work with a
simplistic concept of the "plain meaning" rule79 that fails to observe the
important difference between measuring "plainness" by the statute alone
and measuring it by the statute-in-context, where context includes
extrinsic materials but not necessarily legislative history.
80
In their argument favoring recourse to extrinsic aids, Rhodes, White,
and Goldman brush off reliance on intrinsic aids as not representing a
search for "meaning," because it involves only applying "the proper
maxim" and then beholding the legislative intent.8 1 As communication
73 Kernochan, supra note 61, at 352 n. 78.
7' Rhodes, White, & Goldman, "The Search for Intent: Aids to Statutory Construction in
Florida" (1978) 6 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 383.
7- Ibid. at 383.
76 Ibid. at 389-402 (the authors also discuss the use of extrinsic materials generally).
71 Ibid. at 403-404.
78 Ibid. at 405-407.
'9 Ibid. 384-385.
o See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
81 Rhodes. White & Goldman. supra note 74, at 385.
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theory, this will surprise people used to relying also on syntax and internal
context. The authors say that "it seems illogical .. to rely on [the
canons] exclusively when direct evidence of legislative intent [presumably
legislative history] is within reach." 82 (Is statutory language "indirect"?)
In any event, junking the canons of interpretation does not necessarily
lead to relying on legislative history.
Rhodes, White, and Goldman are not overwhelmed by the argument
that practical unavailability to the legislative audience rules out recourse
to legislative history. "[W]hen basic rights are at issue, the courts may
construe a statute prospectively. '" 83 This is not as easy as it sounds.
Because whatever meaning law finding uncovers necessarily attached at
enactment, the theory that allows deferred effective dates for "interpreta-
tions" presumes instances in which the court is making new law either by
assigning a meaning where no legislative or court-attributed meaning
previously existed or by replacing an erroneous judicial interpretation
with a presumably correct one. 84 In the latter situation, a look at
legislative history may not be useless. But to use this device during the
cognitive phase risks eroding the constitutional exclusiveness of the
statutory vehicle.
Accepting the realistic notion of vicarious legislative intent, Rhodes,
White, and Goldman, citing G. Folsom, claim that its reach extends to
validating committee reports as authoritative statements. 85 Vicarious
intent certainly encompasses legislative intent as expressed in the statute.
But it can rarely encompass legislative intent as expressed in the report in
situations where it is not merely confirmatory, because normal legislative
talk is about "bills," not "reports."
As for ulterior purposes, individual legislators naturally advert to their
own purposes and, since these are presumably adequately served by the
statutory expression of legislative intent, there is no occasion to be
concerned with the fact that the sponsors and others may have had (and
collaterally declared) different ulterior purposes. Their normal irrelevance
thus makes ihem an unlikely object of adoption by legislators only loosely
acquainted with the proposed legislation. Rhodes, White, and Goldman's
claim carries more plausibility where the statement in question accompa-
nies the recommendations of the initiating organization.
Rhodes, White, and Goldman's general philosophy is summarized in
their statement that the "preponderance of case law dismisses attempts to
limit the evidence which the court may consider, although the weight
accorded such evidence varies from case to case." 6 On the basis of this,
they weigh the respective values of broad categories of legislative history,
without regard, however, for whether the constituent statements convey
intended meaning or ulterior purpose.
82 Ibid.
83 Rhodes, White & Goldman, supra note 74, at 388 (footnote omitted).
8 R. Dickerson, supra note 3, at 255-261.
s Rhodes, White & Goldman, supra note 74, at 390.
86 See ibid. at 389.
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What about criteria of selection? "Certainly, one may assume that
judges will exercise reasoned judgment in relying on these materials." 87
But, in view of the weil documented pitfalls here, one may wonder
whether the authors' faith has been vindicated. There is much evidence
that it has not.
Where materials are used only for confirmatory purposes, there is little
to complain about. As for "debates reflecting a common agreement
among legislators of the meaning of ambiguous language," 88 there is
something to complain about if the ambiguity is only apparent and it is
resolved differently by total context.
The difficulty posed by loosely disciplined judicial freedom to rely on
extrinsic indications of legislative intent is not only that these materials
are relatively unavailable to the legislative audience but also that
inadequate standards prevail for determining what materials of "legisla-
tive history" may be consulted and that inadequate standards prevail for
evaluating them. It is not enough to tell the audience that the courts are
going to consult legislative history, because the keys for unlocking
meaning on the basis of such materials have never been reliably
determined and disseminated. This is not another instance of variations in
case law. We deal here with extra-legal matters inherent in the going
system of communication, which every constitution impliedly adopts. Nor
is it only a matter of separation of powers. The non-judicial legislative
audience must be taken into account. Realizing the problem, Rhodes,
White, and Goldman undertake to formulate usable standards for
"evaluating the probative force of extrinsic aids."
89
Their first standard is "contemporaneity." "Materials developed before
and during the process of consideration are given greater weight than later
efforts to explain the intended meaning."
90
I would think so. First of all, under no theory of communication could
post-enactment statements be considered part of context, because there is
no way that either legislature or audience could have taken them into
account during the process of enactment. (Even for confirmatory
purposes, they grow progressively weaker with the passage of time.) The
same result is reached under a concept of statutory context that recognizes
the element of "taking account of," which means joint reliance by author
and audience. Similarly, statements made before enactment normally
weaken with the passage of time.
The second standard is "credibility." "The more explanatory and
analytical and less contrived the extrinsic aid, the greater the weight it will
be accorded." 9'
I buy "credibility" as synonymous with "reliability." As for the
supporting statement, should we read it as a prediction or as a proposed
subsidiary standard? I can't evaluate the former and I don't see how the
17 Ibid. at 396 (referring specifically to committee hearings).
8 Ibid. at 398 (footnote omitted).
89 Ibid. at 403.
90 Ibid.
9' Ibid. at 403.
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latter is in any way helpful. Is the more detailed and structurally more
complicated likely to be more reliable? I would have thought that the
authors would have talked, instead, about the probabilities of accuracy
and bias under the circumstances and whether a statement made sense
internally and harmonized with other, reliable information. And how
could a court know whether a statement was "contrived" without delving
into inaccessible motives and suppressed understandings? The supporting
assertions that "reports of committees are generally regarded with respect
by the courts" and that floor "debates . . . have been excluded as too
unreliable in many jurisdictions" seem more consistent with wholesale
acceptance or rejection than with the case-by-case approach that they
seem to advocate.
Rhodes, White, and Goldman's third standard is "proximity." "The
closer the source of the aid to the essence of legislative action, the more
persuasive the aid is viewed by the courts."
92
The spacial metaphor may be aesthetically appealing, but it seems
undesirably static for a functional relationship. As for the supporting
assertion, is this, again, a prediction or a proposed standard? If the latter,
how does a court define and locate "legislative essence"? Is this not an
amorphous concept more part of the problem than part of its solution?
One also wonders whether the authors meant the essence of legislation in
the abstract, as they seem to say, or the essence of the legislation in
question.
The fourth standard is "context." This would seem to be the correct
standard. It becomes clear, however, that the authors are not talking
about the total context of the statute but rather about the internal context
of the legislative history taken as a whole. "The weight given a particular
aid will vary depending on other factors in the legislative history of the
statute such as consensus and availability.,
93
If we are going to rely on relevant, presumably reliable legislative
history, it makes sense to read it as a whole. However, this in no way bears
on the problem posed by limitations on the scope of the context of the
statute.
In later applying these criteria to California legislative history, student
writer 'Walter Kendall Hurst interprets "contemporaneity" as helping
determine whether the extrinsic aid "actually plays a part in the thinking
process of the legislators during the enactment process." 94 If this is true,
this criterion is helpful in applying the broader requirement that, to be
part of the context of the statute, material must have been "taken account
of" by the legislature and its audience as conveying part of the legislative
message. The same may be said of the requirement of "proximity," which
does for the spatial aspects what the standard of contemporaneity does for
the temporal.
After examining the judicial use of the various kinds of legislative
92 Ibid. at 403-404.
93 Ibid. at 404.
9' Comment, "The Use of Extrinsic Aids in Determining Legislative Intent in California:
The Need for Standardized Criteria (1980) 12 Pac. LJ. 189, 193.
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history available in California, Hurst concludes, citing as an example
People v. Tanner's95 reliance on "a plethora of extrinsic aids" (including a
press release and letters), 96 that the California courts "need . . . a rational
and [an] objective means of evaluating the relative values of the multitude
of potential extrinsic aids modernly available." 97 He urges case-by-case
treatment using Rhodes, White, and Goldman's standards.
On the basis of those two exercises, I am not persuaded that the four
proposed criteriajust considered provide an adequate set of guidelines for
handling legislative history.
Steven E. Smith, who, without attempting to formulate a theory of
statutory interpretation, follows the California tendency to identify the
search for legislative intent with the investigation of legislative history,
seems to conclude that the California courts are becoming too lax in their
reliance on extrinsic materials in the interpretation of statutes. 98 He is
particularly offended by the courts' recent reliance on oral testimony by
legislators or authors, letters of legislators quoted in law journals, and
authorized statements of intent prepared and published after enactment,
in instances where the material so referred to recounted what went on
during consideration of the bill.99 In other words, California courts are
accepting these evidences as ad hoc publication of legislative deliberations
and giving them the weight Federal courts give to officially published
congressional committee hearings.
Although California courts refuse to allow a witness to state his own
opinion of what a statute means,1 the California Supreme Court recently
allowed the introduction of a legislator-author's letter that recited his
personal opinion as having been "argued to that effect in obtaining the
bill's passage," it having been printed, after enactment, in legislative
journals not normally referred to for such purposes. 2 Such thinking bodes
ill for the future of statutory interpretation in California.
To curtail excesses in this limited area, Smith recommends that a court
consider statements by a legislator only if they are made in sworn
testimony subject to cross-examination, the opposing party has been
informed in advance, and the role of the legislator in writing, introducing,
or securing passage of the bill has been ascertained. With these and other
precautions, Smith considers statements by legislators, if used "with great
caution," helpful in filling gaps in state legislative history.3 Availability to
the legislative audience is simply ignored.
9' 24 Cal. 3d 514, 596 P.2d 328, 156 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1929).
96 Comment, supra note 94, at 213.
97 Ibid. at 216.
9 See Smith, "Legislative intent: In search of the Holy Grail" (1978) 53 Cal. St. BJ. 294
(discussing In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427
(1976).
9 Ibid. at 296-298 (emphasis in original).
' Ibid. at 294-295.
2 Ibid. at 297-298 (emphasis in original).
3 Ibid. at 298-299
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Judge Richard A. Posner has made an interesting evaluation of the
impact of economic forces on the development, constitutionality, and
interpretation of legislation, of which only the last concerns us here.
Preliminarily, he observes that "the meaning of a statute is not fixed
until the courts have interpreted the statute. Judicial interpretation of
statutes is thus an intrinsic part of a complete economic theory of
legislation." 4 This is reminiscent of Professor John Chipman Gray's
notion that a statute is not law until the courts breathe life into it.5 This
notion overlooks the fact that the great bulk of statutory meaning gets
enacted and acted on without help from the courts.6 Gray's fallacy was a
common result of subsisting on a diet of case law. I cannot evaluate
Posner's position, because it is not clear what he means by "fixed."
In any event, I question his later statement that courts "do not
speculate on the motives of the legislators in enacting the statute....
[They] do not have the research tools .... 7 (Presumably, "motives"
means ulterior purposes). This may be partly true with respect to the
legislative impact of interest groups, on which Posner was focusing, where
the persuasive purposes (the "real" ones) have gone underground. But it
can hardly be true of the ulterior legislative purposes often recited in, or
inferable from, statutory text or revealed by common knowledge or
legislative history. How else could some of the currently accepted
"purpose" theories of statutory interpretation have developed?
More persuasive is his statement that "however conscientiously the
judge tries to follow the legislature's will, he will be limited to the
statutory text and to other public materials." 8 Unfortunately, he seems to
imply that legislative history qualifies as "public materials" and otherwise
meets the requirements of context. "Public" in theory? Arguably.
"Public" in practice? Highly doubtful.
For Posner, who confronts only the cognitive function, the more
significant question is whether courts should write off legislative history
on the ground that "legislators vote on the statutory language rather than
on the legislative history.9 He believes that they should not write off
legislative history, in view of"a considerable amount of 'log rolling'-that
is, vote trading.... Log rolling implies that legislators often vote without
regard to their personal convictions."' 0 Because such a legislator assents
to a "deal" rather than the statute, and because "[t]he terms of the deal
presumably are stated accurately in the committee reports and in the floor
comments of the sponsors,'1 he implies that it is proper for the court to
look at such materials in determining meaning.
If it is, should it not make a difference whether the log rolling was
4 Posner, "Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution." (1982)
49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 264.5J. Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law (2nd ed. 1921), 124-125.
6 SeeJ. Hurst, supra note 51, at 31.
7 Posner, supra note 4 (p. 150) at 272 (footnote omitted).
" Ibid. at 273.
9 Ibid. at 274.
'o Ibid. at 275.
" Ibid.
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pervasive or incidental? If it should, how could a court that did not have
"the research tools that [it needs] to discover the motives behind
legislation"1 2 get at legislative facts that inevitably lurk below the surface?
I am more bothered by an apparent non sequitur. That log rolling has
occurred does not mean that the legislators involved were not voting, in a
very real sense, their personal convictions. All it means is that each
participant has treated the other's bill as a means rather than as an end.
He believes that under the circumstances his legislative values will best be
served by voting for a bill that he might otherwise oppose or be indifferent
to, after he has determined that its enactment will not exact too great a
price. His legislative intent may be vicarious, but no more so than in a
non-log rolling situation in which a legislator votes for a bill because a
trusted colleague has assured him that it is "a good bill." The main lesson
to be drawn from log rolling is that there is an almost unlimited range of
potential ulterior reasons for intending that a bill be enacted. However,
even wide differences in ulterior purpose do not necessarily mean
differences in legislative intent. Besides, the likelihood that legislative
history will disclose the nature of the "deal" is slim, because this kind of
legislative maneuvering normally has low visibility.
In his attack on the plain meaning rule, which he identifies with
literalism,13 Professor Arthur W. Murphy argues that one of the benefits
of eliminating the rule would be to "force the courts to rationalize the use
of legislative history.' 4 Indeed, "[a]bandonment of the plain meaning
ritual might be a first step toward development of a coherent approach to
statutory interpretation generally.
15
But any notion that flight from the rule leads inevitably into legislative
history necessarily ignores the existence and role of external context.
External context is not limited to legislative history and indeed probably
doesn't even include it. For one thing, a modified version of the plain
meaning rule, and one that makes a good deal of sense, centers, not on a
literal reading of the statutory text, but on a reading of the statutory text
taken in total context. 16 But even under Murphy's more traditional
statement of the plain meaning rule, there is plenty among the rich
resources of internal statutory context to generate uncertainties not
revealed by a literal readirig of the text.
Incidentally, Murphy makes a distinction that corresponds closely, if
not identically, to that between the cognitive and the creative functions of
courts.
[T]he courts should recognise ... that frequently there is no
reliable evidence of intent, even in the broad sense of purpose, to
guide them, and that their role changes as the signal grows
12 Ibid. at 272.
13 Murphy, "Old Maxims Never Die: The 'Plain Meaning Rule' and Statutory Interpreta-
tion in the 'Modern Federal Courts' " (1975) 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1299.
14 Ibid. at 1315.
'
5 Ibid. at 1316.
"b See e.g. Hutton v. Phillips 45 Del. 156. 70 A.2d 15 (Super. Ct. 1949), discussed in R.
Dickerson, supra note 3 (p. 76). at 231-232.
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weaker.... The relationship of legislature and court cannot be solely
one of command. In large areas it must be one of delegation ....... 17
Substantively, this is solid. My only quibble is that the courts' law
making power comes, not only by implied delegation from the legislature,
but also from the applicable constitution as one aspect of the separation of
powers. My only substantial objection is that Murphy, like Posner, has
not fully recognized the nature and force of external context.
Another article worth mentioning is Sean Donahue's plea for "a
semiotic interpretation of statutes," 18 in which he rejects legislative
history as an aid to cognition on the basis of the general thesis of The
Interpretation and Application of Statutes,19 outlined above.20 His main mission
is to urge, as an alternative aid to cognition, the adoption of Professor
Elmer A. Driedger's principle that the reader of a statute "must try to
reconstruct, from the words of the Act, the draftsman's final legislative
scheme. In other words, he must reverse the drafting process."'- This he
proposes to do with the help of Noam Chomsky's rules of generative and
transformational grammar, tree diagrams, Jerrold Katz's projection rules,
and various other aspects of linguistics or semiotics22 that I am
unqualified to comment on. The important point is that there are escape
routes from the evils of literalism other than the path of legislative
history.23
Extending and Improving Legislative History
Earlier I predicted that making legislative history more available would
result largely in increasing the judicial appetite for it.24 This is portended
by frequent requests for recording more of the legislative process,
including stating in state committee reports the reasons for the actions
taken, the recording of state committee proceedings and floor debates, and
Rhodes, White, and Goldman's recommendations for statements of
legislative explanation and intent,25 the annotation of floor debates, 26 and
filing all "reports, memoranda, fact sheets, and other such material which
seeks to analyse, explain, 'sell' or defend legislation. " 27
So much for quantity. As for quality, we have as an example Smith's
X7 Murphy, supra note 13 (p. 151) at 1317.
18 Donahue, supra note 12 (p. 78).
19 See R. Dickerson, supra note 3. (p. 76).
20 See, supra notes 18-26 (pp. 78-80) and accompanying text.
21 Donahue, supra note 12 (p. 78), at 214 (quoting Driedger, "A New Approach to Statutory
Interpretation (1951) 29 Can. Bar. Rev. 838, 843; see also W. Statsky, supra note 13 (p. 78),
at 13-20 ("Developing Techniques of Interpreting Statutes by Trying Your Own Hand at
Drafting Statutes").
22 Ibid. at 216-229.
23 Samuels, supra note 25 (p. 80), at 90-102, makes a number of solid points, but their
relevance may be diluted by differences in England's constitutional separation of powers.
24 See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
2' Rhodes, White & Goldman, supra note 74, at 405-07.
26 Ibid. at 406.
27 Ibid.
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recommendations for legitimating courtroom testimony by individuals
participating in the legislative process.
28
Ironically, such "improvements," by their very bulk and complexity,
tend to undercut rather than advance efforts to bring legislative history
into the context of the statute. Even the computerization of legislative
history is an inadequate answer to nonavailability, because it tends to
widen the already wide gap between the well-heeled litigant and the
financially ill-favoured one. 29 Have we not already priced much ofjustice
out of the market?
On the other hand, most advocates of using legislative history who
seriously investigate the practicalities of its development and use (after
rejecting the approach of improving statutory text) conclude that most of
it is unreliable and the rest of it is of so little use that it becomes desirable
to improve or replace it. This feeling usually culminates in a recommenda-
tion to create accompanying statements of legislative intent or statements
of ulterior purpose. 3
The former, of course, must be rejected as competing with the statute.
As for legislative history generally, Professor Kenneth S. Abraham makes
a telling point: "Reliance on legislative records ... present[s] the same
problem as reliance on the statutory text itself. Legislative records are also
text and do not come to the reader already interpreted."
31
Suppose that we somehow surmount the difficulties of composition and
produce a comprehensible purpose clause. In such a case, it is common,
on further reflection, to conclude that it makes better sense to include the
usefully expressible in the statute itself,32 bringing us full circle to the
better-drafting approach whose rejection we assumed at the outset.
The final irony is that studies of general purpose clauses have shown
that most of them wind up as pious incantations of little practical value
because what little value they have is usually inferable from the working
text. Indeed, the draftsmen who consolidated title 49 (part only) of the
United States Code, in their bill restating Federal transportation laws,
3 3
dropped most existing purpose clauses as superfluous and, I am informed,
no one complained.
Although a general purpose clause is occasionally useful,3 4 the most
useful clauses are those introducing particular sentences, which offer the
advantage of focused specificity.
35
• 1 Smith, supra note 98, at 298-299: see supra text accompanying note 3 (p. 149).2 9 J. Davies, supra note 59, at 255.
30 See, e.g. Rhodes, White & Goldman, supra note 74, at 405-407.
31 Abraham, "Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory: Some Common Concerns of an
Unlikely Pair" (1979) 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 676, 684-685.
12 "A statement of intent has a paradoxical quality: the more it attains, the status of an
objective footprint on the trail of legislative enactment, the more it becomes a mere
restatement of the statute properly included in the statute itself." Final Report, supra note
65, at 32.
-3 H.R. 14028, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 25, 1969.
"4 R. Dickerson, Legislative Drafting 107-108 (1954).
35 See Renton, supra note 43 (p. 84), at 10-11 The Preparation of Legislation, Cmnd. 6053, at 63,
150 (1975) (similar conclusions reached by a committee of which Lord Renton was
chairman).
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Conclusion
The cruel fact is that there is no interpretative cure that will relieve the
courts and the legislative audience of the burden of sweating out the
communicative burdens imposed by inadequate draftsmanship or uncon-
trollable political obfuscation. 36 Would not our academic efforts be better
addressed, therefore, to the dialectic37 of legal drafting? In the meantime,
let's confine our scavenging among the flimsy materials of legislative
history to its occasional weak confirmatory use and its possible
suggestiveness during the courts' creative efforts.
Finally, let me mention an intensely practical consideration: Ultimate-
ly, we must face up to the fact that all but a small percentage of new law is
promulgated, not by legislatures or courts, but by administrative agencies
exercising rule-making power (which the British more aptly call
"delegated legislation"). If legislative history is part of external context
and thus vital to understanding statutes, must not "regulatory history" be
vital to understanding the quasi-statutes that confront us as administra-
tive regulations? Think about it.
Postscript
What relevance does this analysis have for parliamentary systems,
especially for those without written constitutions? Because I have done
little scholarly research in this area, I will comment cautiously,
tentatively, and very briefly.
My modest acquaintance with English practices suggests that, except
for two limitations rooted in American constitutions (legislative
supremacy38 and the exclusiveness of the statutory vehicle39 ), much of
American experience in the field of statutory interpretation is broadly
relevant to the debates about legislative history as reflected in recent
issues of thd Stalule Law Review.
Although I surmise that the English doctrine of separation of powers
between legislature and courts would not necessarily prevent Parliament
from delegating significant law making power to the courts even to amend
statutes (such as Professor Davies has suggested4") or from adopting
vehicles other than statutes to deliver its mandates or authorizations, it
36 "No interpretative device can relieve the courts of their ultimate responsibility for
considering the different contexts in which the words of a provision might be read, and in
making a choice between the different meanings which emerge from that consideration."
Commission, supra note 66, at 42.
37 I mean "dialectic" in the classical sense of the art of objectively ascertaining "truth,"
which Plato differentiated from "rhetoric" (the art of persuasion). The Phaedrus 260, 265,
266, 277 in the Dialogues of Plato (Jowett transl., 3rd ed.), as reprinted at p. 233 ofvol. 1 of
the Random House edition, 1937; the page numbers first referred to are those in the
margins. Dialectic apparently includes conceptualization, definition, and "division by
classes." For a helpful summary, see R. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (1953) 15 et seq.
31 See R. Dickerson, supra note 3 (p. 76), at 7-9.
39 See text accompanying note 6 (p. 77) supra.
40 Davies, supra note 8 (p- 78). See also G. Calabresi, supra note 10 (p. 77), e.g. at 101-04,
116-19, 163-66 (1982); "Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law:
Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court," (1982) 95 Harv. L. Rev. 892, 913-14.
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has so far done neither and I suspect that English courts have at least
tacitly assumed a theoretical separation of legislative and judicial powers
roughly approximating our own.
As a participant in the memorable seminar on statutory interpretation
at All Souls College, Oxford, on May 20-21, 1966, I have been much
reassured, until recently, that no serious effort has been made to open the
doors of Hansard, except for confirmatory purposes. I now perceive a
dangerous chipping away at England's generally defensible barriers to
legislative history. 4 1 The temptation to chip is strong, because traditional
excesses of literalism have left modern English jurisprudents with guilt
feelings that they are eager to assuage, in many cases by rushing into the
arms of the apparently more "liberal" (and therefore jurisprudentially
more fashionable) excesses of the American reliance on Federal legislative
history. Here, I need only reaffirm a point made several times in the
article:4 2 Literalism is better avoided through understanding the workings
of external context than by opening wide the almost inexhaustible
Pandora's box of legislative history. British judges are not necessarily
insensitive to external context,4 3 and they should more forthrightly
acknowledge its efficacy.
Lord Scarman made a good point when he said, "The common law is
delightful, but it is now of marginal importance only."'' If so, the courts
should be all the more scrupulous about safeguarding constitutionally
expressed 4 5 legislative will. To this end, they should be more adequately
faithful to the extra-legal principles of communication. Although English
41 E.g. see Sacks, "Towards Discovering Parliamentary Intent" [1982] Stat. L. R. 143. How
serious this chipping away is depends on the extent, if any, to which English judges are
relying on legislative history without first establishing the existence of an otherwise
unresolvable uncertainty of meaning or a delegation of law-making power to supplement
the statutory scheme.
In her impressive analysis of legislative history, Sacks finds that, while "Hansard failed
to provide definitive conclusions," it helped locate the statutory "mischief." Ibid. at
159-60. She pinpoints the ultimate trouble as Parliament's failure to communicate to the
legislative audience, owing not so much to bad drafting as to the need for a "substantial
overhaul of the whole legislative system," the main contributions of which would be "to
include a statement of intent in every act" and to supplement each bill "by very detailed
explanatory memoranda as it proceeds through the Houses of Parliament." Ibid. at
158-59. What she does not explain is how any modern legislative system can be reformed
with respect to the availability of time, personnel, political opportunity, and individual
incentive to produce such assumedly adequate repositories of legislative meaning.
2 E.g. see text accompanying notes supra 79-80, 13-16 (p. 151 ).
4 See Williams, "The Meaning of Literal Interpretation" (1981) 131 New L.J. 1128-1129,
1149-1151; R. Cross supra note 28 (p. 81), at 44-52, 122 et seq. quoting (at p. 48) Viscount
Simonds in A.-G. v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [19571 A.C. 436, at 461 ("...
words ... cannot be read in isolation: their colour and content are derived from their
context .... I use 'context' in its widest sense .... ). Lord Denning in Escoigne Properties,
Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1958] A.C. 549, at 566 is more specific: In interpreting
statutes, courts should "take judicial notice of the previous state of the law and of other
matters generally known to well-informed people." But nowhere in English legal literature
have I found adequate recognition and analysis of the vast category of shared relevant
tacit assumptions that make up the bulk of external context.
" Editorial, [1983] Stat. L. Rev. 1, 4.
5 This would seem to include only the text of the official statutory vehicle as conditioned by
total context.
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courts have preened themselves on guarding legislative expression, even
to the point of pretending never to make law in the context of statutes,
they have in fact made law not only by the fiction of "deeming" but also
by treating the principles of legal communication as if they were matters
of case law rather than extra-legal principles of independent validity.
I suggest also that English jurisprudence would gain much in
consistency and clarity if it acknowledged the legitimacy of a solid strain
of judicial law making in resolving uncertainties or supplementing
statutes.4 6 This would remove much of the pressure to bastardize
fundamental principles of communication to achieve equitable results.
This, in turn, would allow English courts to articulate more candidly and
persuasively the principles of cognition, especially those relating to the
nature and extent of external context.
A broader benefit would be to help eliminate the largely futile debates
between the adherents of the "plain meaning" or "golden rule" approach
and the adherents of the "purposive" approach by making clear that these
approaches appropriately clarified, are not only valuable but com-
plementary rather than competitive. When integrated into a unified
philosophy of statutory interpretation, 47 these independently inadequate
approaches should disappear from view, with great benefit to all.
Although legislative theory is much broader than legislative history, the
latter cannot be clarified without clarifying the former. In this light, I
humbly suggest that a perusal of American sources such as I have cited
here,48 may offer valuable light on what now appears to be lacking in
England's legislative jurisprudence.
416 Some inclination to do this appears in Sacks, supra note 41 (p. 155), at 148, and in R.
Gross, supra note 28, at 141 (in case of "real doubt," a judge should be able to look at
pre-parliamentary materials "as a pointer to the meaning which he should attach to the
particular provision" (emphasis added)).
47 The possibility of this is discussed in Williams, supra note 43 (p. 155). See also D. V. Cowen,
"The Interpretation of Statutes and the Concept of the Intention of the Legislature,"
(1980) J. of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law 374-399, summarized in [1982] Stat. L. R.
117-19.
4 Undisciplined modesty prevents me from recommending that the English reader start
with The Interpretation and Application of Statutes, supra note 3 (p. 76).
